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Environmental policy, 
municipalities and 
intergovernmental cooperation 
in Brazil 
EstEla Maria souza Costa NEvEs
EffEctivE EnvironmEntal policies are indispensable for the sus-tainability of long-term development for meeting both domestic chal-lenges and the so-called global issues. the purpose of this paper is to 
contribute to the understanding of environmental governance in Brazil through 
the exploratory analysis of the relationship between municipalities and envi-
ronmental policy strategies developed by the federal Government, from the 
perspective of the Brazilian federative state.
the central argument presented herein holds that in Brazil, for an impor-
tant number of topics on the environmental agenda, the success of the initiatives 
promoted by the federal government depends to some extent on the adhesion 
of municipalities. Since 1988, endowed with the status of federated entities and 
enjoying unprecedented autonomy, municipalities can contribute to the failure 
of federal initiatives by not subscribing to said initiatives, especially these require 
the exercise of their exclusive powers and the allocation of their own resources.
nationwide public policies promoted by central governments require the 
involvement of local government actors either to tailor policy objectives and 
regulations to local specificities, harmonize conflicting priorities, or optimize 
the use of increasingly scarcer public resources. the structure of intergovern-
mental relations is a crucial factor for the success of public policies implemented 
at central level, especially the promotion of the mutual and enriching adaptation 
of national and local perspectives (villanueva, 2000, p.40).
the importance of the participation of local governments, however, is 
not restricted to the host of benefits pointed out in the literature about the ad-
vantages of localized state action - such as increased efficiency, less corruption, 
promotion of direct democracy practices, greater social control, transparency 
and greater capacity to meet local specificities and preferences. the federative 
structure is one of the most important references for understanding public poli-
cies in Brazil, which has undergone significant changes since the country’s de-
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mocratization (abrucio, 2005). in federative countries, local governments have 
autonomy to formulate policies according to their own priorities, in their area 
of  competence. in the absence of the hierarchical mechanisms that characterize 
unitary states, they participate only voluntarily in programs proposed by the 
federal government. as highlighted by arretche (1999, p.81), “the possibility 
for local governments to implement policies desired by the federal government 
directly depends on the latter’s ability to induce the first to adopt a given action 
strategy.”
the paper is organized in four sections. the first section discusses the role 
of intergovernmental cooperation in environmental policy. the main character-
istics of municipalities as local government entities in the federative structure 
of the Brazilian state are presented in the second section. the third section 
discusses the relevance of the participation of municipalities in the main strate-
gies adopted by the federal government on the environmental agenda, through 
examples taken from the constitutional environmental agenda in the areas of 
fight against deforestation and management of territorially protected areas. the 
main conclusions and developments are presented at the end.
Environmental policy and intergovernmental cooperation
cooperation between actors is a key topic in the field of public policy, il-
lustrated by at least two classic texts on public policy research. the term “com-
plexity of joint action” was chosen by Pressman & Wildavsky (1973 p.87s) to 
designate relevant factors in the implementation of public policies - the number 
of participants with different perspectives and the multiplicity of decision points 
and clearance. the interdependence between actors, revealed by the imperative 
of cooperation, is illustrated by a well-known image used by Bardach (1977, 
p.37-8), who describes implementation as a process of assembling the parts of a 
machine and getting it to work, with the participation of many actors in several 
aspects that are independent of each other.
in the field of environmental policy, the need for cooperation is even more 
pronounced. the inevitability of joint action among organizations is underlined 
by the definition of environmental policy as a multi-agency policy (vig & Kraft, 
2010) and by the work of oates (2001) on the distribution of environmental 
tasks, which  recognizes  environmental policy as essentially a joint activity be-
tween governments.
five basic characteristics of environmental policy, discussed below, en-
able  a more precise outlining of the need for cooperation among government 
entities for environmental purposes: the simultaneous involvement of multiple 
political and administrative spheres in the management of environmental pro-
cesses; intersectionality; the multiplicity of actors and organizations present in 
the environmental arena; the multiple temporal and spatial scales of environ-
mental processes; and the tension between trends towards the centralization and 
decentralization of state action.
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Environmental goods and problems often cross administrative boundar-
ies, simultaneously involving more than one political-administrative entity in 
its protection and management – whether local, regional or national (fiorino, 
1995; Paehlke, 1996). common examples in the literature are water and air pol-
lution processes, but there are many others on the wider environmental agenda.
the term “intersectionality” refers to required state intervention in areas 
under the responsibility of other administrative sectors capable of impacting 
environmental quality, such as infrastructure projects and large industrial un-
dertakings. approaches that presuppose cooperative action among the sectors 
involved collide with the administrative tradition of the public sector, in which 
each public policy topic is organized in a compartmentalized way, such as the re-
spective units responsible for developing and implementing programs. the en-
vironmental issue has invariably been treated as an airtight sector, far from core 
strategic government decisions. the administrative fragmentation and “encap-
sulation” of environmental policy in sectoral agencies have prevailed even in the 
administrative structures of advanced countries (Durant et al., 2004; Paehlke & 
torgerson, 2005).
Environmental defense involves many actors, defining numerous arenas 
for each topic on the broad environmental defense agenda. Each of them in-
volves different interests of civil associations, private companies, local repre-
sentations, businesses and trade unions, global governance and transnational 
civil society organizations, as well as local, regional and national governments 
and institutional representatives of diffuse interests (in the case of Brazil, the 
federal Public Prosecutor). concerted and democratic solutions are essential: 
in their absence, conflicts and disagreeing interpretations of regulations lead to 
the submission of disputes to the judicial sphere, with paralyzing effects for the 
decision-making process (lafferty & meadowcroft, 1996).
Processes such as the provision of environmental services occur in a wide 
range of spatial and temporal scales (tomich et al., 2004), requiring different 
policy actions at multiple spatial scales. the spatiality of environmental gov-
ernance overlaps multiple geographical scales, differing significantly from the 
traditional geographies of the nation-state and from international relations 
(Eckerberg & Joas, 2004). in the temporal dimension, long-term environmen-
tal processes require strategies that combine short- and long-term measures, 
achievable only through the commitment of successive governments, so as to 
enable strategies to endure over successive electoral mandates, in the counter-
current of the logic of short-term action by the political class.
the distribution of responsibilities between levels of government regard-
ing a specific environmental problem is often an issue, allowing for gaps and 
overlaps. it is a challenge that for decades has been the object of debates that 
have outlined the field of tension between centralized and decentralized action. 
much of the environmental movement has taken a stand in favor of decentral-
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ized action for ideological reasons, according to the eco-localist model, of a po-
litical nature - local solutions would lend themselves more to a participatory and 
“bottom-up” policy approach. Despite the strength of the arguments raised by 
advocates of local environmental action, the adoption of local initiatives alone 
has proven theoretically  inconsistent in empirically unfeasible (mercier, 1994). 
the emergence of global environmental challenges is one of the factors show-
ing that centralized environmental planning and management, even where its 
implementation tends towards decentralization, is vital. it depends on central 
governments initiatives for international agreements, associated with decentral-
ized actions by intermediary or local government entities in a vertical intergov-
ernmental cooperation arrangement.
Characteristics of the municipality in Brazilian federalism 
federalism was adopted in Brazil in the late nineteenth century to recon-
cile the aspirations of different areas of the territory: to preserve the national ter-
ritorial unity threatened by loose economic ties between regions and by external 
relations maintained individually by each region; to accommodate the demands 
of elites with conflicting objectives; and to respond to regional disparities. for 
a century, oligarchic regionalism marked the trajectory of the Brazilian model, 
with advances and setbacks, until such time as it became the current federalism 
along the lines of the 1988 federal constitution (rezende & afonso, 2003; 
Souza, 2005). Some features of Brazilian federalism differ from the dominant 
patterns in federated countries, especially in four aspects of interest to this study 
for understanding the role of municipalities:  number of government entities in 
the federation; distribution of the tax-levying power; socioeconomic disparities; 
and intergovernmental relations.
the predominant pattern in federations is the bigovernmental model, 
comprised of regional governments and the central government. in Brazil, tri-
une federalism was adopted in 1988: municipalities have the same status as re-
gional governments (states) and the central government (Union), as well as 
political and administrative entities with legal personality under internal public 
law.1 consequently, the apparatus of the Brazilian State currently includes 5,565 
municipalities, 26 States and the federal District, indicating the complexity of 
the institutional architecture of these relationships.
Unlike the majority of federations, in which there is relative revenue concentration in 
the central government, in Brazil the decentralization of tax powers to subnational govern-
ments is considered important, although it has evolved to the point of causing a mismatch 
between revenues and responsibilities and, in parallel, with the increase in taxes levied by the 
federal government (rezende & afonso, 2003). although heterogeneity is a typical fea-
ture of federations, there are huge socioeconomic, environmental and institutional disparities 
among Brazilian municipalities - the term municipality includes “realities of scarce common 
content” (affonso, 2000, p.27). multiple inequalities lead to the institutional dilemma of 
how to treat deeply unequal entities, the so-called asymmetrical federalism (almeida, 2001).
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intergovernmental relations in Brazil have conflicting characteristics. 
considering the amount of tasks simultaneously assigned to the three levels of 
government, formally it can be said that the Brazilian federation is undoubtedly 
cooperative. However, the literature gives more emphasis to the predominance 
of an uncooperative profile in practice, expressed by predatory competition and 
the compartmentalized action of federated units (abrucio, 2005). the ties be-
tween the levels of government are considered diffuse and conflicting, and re-
sponsible for the fragmentation of power. relations between federated entities 
have been governed by tense coexistence between new democratic models of 
political action and traditional modes of action characterized by patrimonialism 
and clientelism, direct agreement between municipalities and the Union with-
out the participation of the State, and centralizing and decentralizing trends of 
different motivations (almeida, 2005).
The role of local governments in Brazilian federation 
the autonomy of federated entities is defined as the power to manage 
their own affairs within a field pre-established by a higher level - the feder-
al constitution – in the organizational, political, administrative and financial 
spheres. as a federated entity, the municipality has the power to organize its 
organic law (in the past delegated to the states), enjoys political autonomy (i.e., 
the power to elect its rulers; the possibility of appointing mayors no longer ex-
ists), has exclusive powers and common powers with other entities, and has had 
its tax base expanded (Silva, 1989).
the power to legislate is indicatively restricted: municipalities can legislate 
on all matters of local interest and supplementary to federal and state legisla-
tions,  excluding matters falling under exclusive federal competence.
the main material powers of municipalities are organized in table 1, dis-
tinguishing between legislative and materials powers - and within these, exclu-
sive powers and concurrent powers with States and the Union.
matters falling exclusively under municipal jurisdiction include, besides 
transportation (as shown in the table), services enshrined in the tradition of mu-
nicipal administration: collection and treatment of municipal solid waste; basic 
sanitation that traditionally encompasses water supply, collection and treatment 
of domestic sewage; storm drainage; paving; management of solid domestic and 
urban waste; street lighting; traffic in urban areas; local roads; open markets; 
slaughterhouses; urban security; health; social assistance; sports; and leisure and 
recreation (meirelles, 2001 p.407s).
finally, although the topic is not expressly addressed in the constitutional 
sphere, it is worth pointing out, among the exclusive duties of municipalities, 
the responsibility for establishing their urban and rural areas,2 dissociated from 
their responsibility for territorial planning, as it has important consequences for 
the urban, fiscal and environmental order.
table 1 – Explicit constitutional powers of municipalities
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type of Power atribuições explícitas municipais
Exclusive power 
(fc arts.
30 and 128)
institute and collect taxes within their jurisdiction, as well as to apply 
their revenues. 
organize its territory into districts.
organize and render, directly or by concession or permission, the pub-
lic services of local interest, including mass-transportation, which is of 
essential nature (fc, art. 30, v).
maintain, with the technical and financial cooperation of the Union and 
the states, programs of pre-school and elementary school education. 
Promote the protection of the local historic and cultural heritage. 
Promote adequate territorial planning, by means of planning and con-
trol of use, apportionment and occupation of the urban soil.
implement urban development policy. 
material pow-
ers common 
to States, the 
Union and the 
federal District 
(fc art. 23)
Ensure that the constitution, the laws and the democratic institutions 
are respected and that public property is preserved. 
Provide for health and public assistance, for the protection and safe-
guard of disabled persons.
Protect documents, works and other assets of historical, artistic or cul-
tural value, monuments, remarkable landscapes and archaeological sites.
Prevent works of art and other assets of historical, artistic and cultural 
value from being taken out of the country, destroyed or deprived of 
their original characteristics.
Provide the means of access to culture, education and science. Protect 
the environment and fight pollution/ preserve forests, fauna and flora.
Promote agriculture and cattle breeding and organize the supply of 
foodstuff.
Promote housing construction programs and the improvement of 
housing and basic sanitation conditions.
fight the causes of poverty and factors leading to substandard living 
conditions.
register, monitor and control concessions of rights to research and ex-
ploit water and mineral resources.
Establish and implement an educational policy for traffic safety.
legislative 
powers  (fc, 
arts. 24, 29 
and 30)
legislate upon matters of local interest – including master Plan and 
organic law.
Supplement federal and state legislations where pertinent. the Union, 
the states and the federal District have the power to legislate concur-
rently on forests, hunting, fishing, fauna, preservation of nature, de-
fense of the soil and natural resources, protection of the environment 
and control of pollution, protection of the historic, cultural and artistic 
heritage, as well as of assets of tourist interest and landscapes of out-
standing beauty; liability for damages to the environment. 
Source: adapted by neves (2006) from Brasil (1989), machado (2011), meirelles (2001)  and-
Silva (2009).
concurrent powers, which entail intergovernmental cooperation, com-
prise specifically the areas of environment, health, education, environmental 
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protection, forests, fauna and flora. the rules for cooperation between gov-
ernment spheres are provided for in complementary laws. once established, 
their enforcement depends on the development of federal arrangements, whose 
structures vary for each area of  government action, as well as the concentration 
of authority, funding methods and relations between entities. Some duties al-
ready have institutional arrangements in place, including some that are consid-
ered successful in the literature, such as health and education (arretche, 2004; 
melo, 2002). other areas of common responsibility such as the environment, 
historical heritage and housing still lack consistent federative arrangements.
other topics that can be considered of local interest include: definition of 
the predominance of local interests varies from municipality to municipality over 
different periods of time, according to its occupation and development history.3 
finally, mentioned should be made of municipal powers that are not explicitly 
provided for, but that result from the logical consequence of a constitutional 
power (meirelles, 2001 p.131s).
this set of duties shows the variety and importance of the matters under 
municipal jurisdiction and the scope of its power-duty binomial. By promoting 
the municipalization of multiple duties and the inclusion of the municipality 
amongst federated entities, the federalism introduced in 1988 caused a “massive 
institutional transformation” (melo, 1996) in Brazilian municipalities through 
changes in public policies that reinforced their role, thus consolidating their ac-
tion in matters already within their competence and formally expanding their 
actions to new areas.
currently, Brazilian municipalities are considered essential in the so-called 
welfare functions because of their duties, this being a unique position in the in-
ternational context. However, the conditions for fulfilling their responsibilities 
are extremely diverse. often municipal governments abdicate their autonomy 
due to financial or technical weakness, to political dependence, or still to lack of 
political and institutional conditions to fulfill their common duties.
Municipalities, environmental agenda and intergovernmental co-
operation
from the standpoint of environmental defense, municipalities are entirely 
co-responsible for the environmental mandate, and sole holders of responsibili-
ties that are fundamental for environmental quality: basic sanitation, territorial 
planning and regulation of urban land use.
no further analysis is needed to identify the importance of local govern-
ments as protagonists in water management, which is under federal and state 
responsibility because the municipality is the only government entity capable of 
integrating water management, sanitation and land use management for the pro-
tection of waters. the municipality is responsible for sanitation, which includes 
in its definition, the management of domestic and urban solid waste, water sup-
ply, sewage disposal, urban cleaning, drainage and management of rainwater. 
estudos avançados 26 (74), 2012144
the recognition of this ownership in 2007, although implicitly supported the 
late regulation of sanitation services in Brazil, already under the environmental 
paradigm. the municipality is the only State actor capable of modeling the oc-
cupation of the territory through its exclusive prerogative to determine the stra-
tegic planning of the municipal territory through the master Plan; the allocation 
of areas for urbanization, by defining the urban area; the promotion of specific 
land uses on an exclusive basis or in conjunction with other uses; the definition 
of the ration between free and built spaces; and the determination of hous-
ing density and licensing of location for economic activity. as important as the 
prerogative of using these policy instruments is the enforcement power of the 
municipality to control and curb illegal occupations that may affect riverbanks, 
fragile slopes and watersheds that interfere in the quantity and quality of water resources.
as it is outside the scope of this article to examine thoroughly the federal 
environmental agenda,4 two topics chiefly under federal and state jurisdiction 
have been selected, in which the relevance of municipal participation in federal 
initiatives is not obvious at first glance: the control of deforestation in the ama-
zon and the management of Environmental conservation Units.
Control of Deforestation in the Amazon - about four million square ki-
lometers of the Brazilian amazon were originally occupied by forests. Defor-
estation of the largest existing tropical rainforest has increased in the last four 
decades: 18 percent of the amazon forests have been removed (Brazil, 2009). 
the federal Government has led the coordination of programs and actions to 
combat deforestation in the amazon, in cooperation with the states concerned. 
the protection and management of forests has historically fallen to the federal 
level, and only in 2006 it began to be shared with the states. the inclusion of 
States in the fight against deforestation in the amazon dates to the first de-
cade of the twenty-first century, through a strategy that included improving 
the satellite monitoring of deforestation carried out by the national institute 
for Space research/inPE, in partnership with the ministry of Environment; 
focusing control on the most heavily deforested region, known as the arc of 
Deforestation; developing agendas on federal pacts for joint action between the 
federal Government and amazonian states; integrating environmental inspec-
tion  agencies;  focusing on the economic value of the forest; and licensing rural 
properties (menezes, 2001). a new plan of action was released in 2004, sup-
ported by four pillars: land and territorial planning; environmental monitoring 
and control; promotion of sustainable productive activities; and federal agree-
ments. these initiatives have been limited by governmental failures to comply 
with environmental regulations, lack of coordination between environmental 
agencies and lack of definition of property rights.
a change in strategy was adopted in 2007-2008 through operation 
Green arc5, whose action focused on those municipalities where deforestation 
was occurring at a faster pace, thus municipalizing the fight against deforesta-
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tion by restricting credit to irregular producers, holding the entire production 
chain accountable for illegal deforestation, and publicizing the list of offenders 
and municipalities in more critical situations (Guimarães et al., 2011). the minis-
try of Environment has begun to periodically publish a list of the 36 municipalities 
leaders in deforestation, determining the cut of federal credits for agricultural and 
forestry activities, and establishing conditions for lifting the embargo, involving 
environmental control, monitoring and inspection, territorial planning and land 
regularization. the government has also demanded a drastic reduction in defor-
estation rates and the inclusion of four-fifths of the municipal area in the rural 
Environmental registry (car), a georeferenced system managed by state envi-
ronmental agencies.
Since then, the list of the worst illegal among all municipalities has been 
published annually. in the third edition of the list, the municipality of Paragomi-
nas (in southeast of the State of Pará), which is known for housing hundreds of 
sawmills in its territory, was the first municipality to be removed from the list 
by initiative of the municipal government which, underpinned by a local pact 
between the municipality, productive sectors and producers’ organizations, the 
Public Prosecutor and non-governmental organizations (such as imaZon and 
the nature conservancy/tnc), totaling about 40 organizations, intensified 
supervision procedures and promoted alternatives to a new development model. 
the municipality has become a role model for other municipalities in the ama-
zon and inspired a pact involving the federal Public Prosecutor, the State of 
Pará, iBama, and the federations of associations of municipalities and agricul-
ture of the State of Pará (Brito et al. 2010; Guimarães et al., 2011).  
Management of conservation units - conservation Units (cU) are areas 
protected for environmental purposes, which can be established by the three 
levels: federal, state and municipal. Systematized in the national System of con-
servation Units (SnUc), the cUs cover twelve categories of protected areas, 
organized into two major groups: integral Protection6 and Sustainable Use.7 
With varying degrees of environmental protection restriction and goals, the 
cUs share the fact that they are subject to a special statute for land use and oc-
cupation and management of ecosystems and environmental resources. about 
nine percent the Brazilian territory is protected by federal cUs. the cUs under 
state and municipal jurisdiction cover 422,000 km2 and 35,000 km2 respec-
tively, excluding Environmental Protection areas (aPa) (iBGE, 2010).
there are two key instruments for the management of areas protected 
cUs: the management plan (mandatory for all cUs) and the buffer zone (non-
mandatory only for the aPa and rPPn). the management plan establishes the 
zoning of the area, rules for the use and management of environmental resourc-
es and the construction of physical structures. the buffer zone, which must also 
be provided for in the management plan, is established outside the limits of the 
cU. its function is to mitigate the effects of existing activities that can influence 
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the cU by setting limits to their occupation, and promote the harmonious co-
existence between populations and activities and the cU.8
fulfillment of the rules established by the management plan lies solely 
with the agency responsible for its jurisdiction as regards the surface covered 
by the protected area. in the buffer zone, on the other hand, the situation is 
different: the entity responsible for the cU cannot enforce the rules solely and 
immediately. in this case, the municipal action gains importance for two factors. 
the first is the recognition of the huge lack of human, technical and logistic 
resources for the cU management system, which makes it impossible for the 
oversight body to inspect illegal activities by itself. only partnerships with local 
governments and communities will increase the chances of more effective law 
enforcement in the cUs and their surroundings.
Secondly, at the expense of turning management guidelines into dead let-
ter, the rules established for the buffer zone should be adopted by the munici-
palities and expressed in their master Plan, urban perimeter law, land allotment 
regulation, urban land use and occupation, and guidelines for licensing loca-
tions suitable for economic activity. it should be pointed out that environmental 
licensing procedures for projects in the buffer zones of cUs have recently incor-
porated the more effective participation of the oversight body9 and that the buf-
fer zones of integral protection cUs will be considered, through SnUc regula-
tion, as rural areas in which the division of land for urban purposes is prohibited. 
However, these measures do not affect the essential issue: the participation of 
municipalities is crucial in planning the surroundings of protected areas, both 
for the internalization of rules and restrictions and for control and supervision.
Conclusions and developments
the combination of the typical features of nationwide public policies 
with the continental dimensions of Brazil and the large inter- and intra-regional 
disparities reveals a sharp demand for intergovernmental cooperation, so that 
national policy guidelines can be tailored to local specificities. in terms of en-
vironmental policy this requirement is even stronger because of the structural 
characteristics of environmental processes: more than just a policy style or an 
alternative to overcome the scarcity of resources, intergovernmental coopera-
tion is a sine qua non condition for environmental protection actions to work. 
the analysis of the institutional characteristics of intergovernmental coopera-
tion from the perspective of federative organization shows that municipalities 
enjoy unprecedented importance before the other government spheres owing 
to their status in the triune federation, the extent of their autonomy and the size 
of their constitutional agenda. the implementation of environmental strategies 
developed by the federal government10 often depends on the participation of 
municipalities in the exercise of their exclusive prerogatives such as inspection 
activities, sanctions, territorial planning, control and use of urban land, provi-
sion of infrastructure and facilities responsible for basic habitability conditions.
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the study of the interdependence condition between government levels 
for environmental action vis-à-vis the municipality has been neglected in favor 
of the focus on the autonomy of each federative entity, considered only in its 
self-determination dimension. the interdependence that demands shared rules 
is the reverse of autonomy (self-rule) in federative systems. Underestimating the 
importance of municipal to the success of federal environmental policies is one 
of the biggest obstacles to be overcome in the implementation of federal policies 
and in the very process of building environmental institutionality in Brazil. the 
recognition of interdependence relations paves the way for a new approach in 
which investigating the barriers to cooperative action, implementing strategies 
and instruments that induce and encourage joint action, improving the design 
of environmental institutionality and facing the challenges related to disparities 
in the institutional and political capacity of local governments is of the utmost 
importance.
notes
1 federal constitution, articles 1 and 18.
2 Provided for in Decree-law 311/1938.
3 as said by Silva (2009), the municipal organic law may specify, for each municipality, 
what is of local interest. it is not necessary, however, to have an exhaustive definition 
of what is of local interest in order to exercise related powers.   
4 the exhaustive identification of interfaces between the exclusive competence and the 
broad range of subjects that make up the environmental agenda is not within the sco-
pe of this article.
5 through federal Decree 6321-07.
6 Ecological Station, Biological reserve, national Park, natural monument and Wil-
dlife refuge.
7 Environmental Protection areas, areas of relevant Ecological interest, national fo-
rest, Extractive reserve, Wildlife reserve, Sustainable Development reserve, and Pri-
vate natural Heritage reserve.
8 law no. 9985, article 25.
9 through conama resolution no. 428 of 2010.
10 the same reasoning applies to the States. 
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abstraCt – the purpose of this paper is to explore the role of intergovernmental co-
operation in federal environmental policies from the perspective of Brazilian local go-
vernments, considering the Brazilian federal institutional  framework. the analysis of 
the constitutional  municipal agenda highlights that environmental defense activities 
provide the background for the analysis of selected examples of federal environmental 
policy.  We conclude that federal success depends to a great extent on municipal support 
because they are in a unique position to combine the use of typical environmental stra-
tegies and instruments with policy instruments exclusive to municipalities.
KEywords: Environmental policy, local government, federalism, Environmental go-
vernance, intergovernamental relations.
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